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What Goes Around Comes Around-
Nichols v. United States:
Validating the Collateral Use
of Uncoimseled Misdemeanor
Convictions for the Purpose
of Sentence Enhancement
I. INTRODUCTION
re-cid-iovism/ra' sidavizam/Webster's Dictionary defines recidi-
vism as "repeated relapse into criminal or delinquent habits."' The
criminal justice system combats recidivism through harsher sentencing
and enhanced prison sentences for repeat offenders In order for a
sentencing judge to determine whether a defendant deserves a more
severe penalty, however, it is vital that the judge be fully apprised of
the defendant's criminal background.' In making this assessment, it is
well accepted that a judge cannot consider prior convictions that have
subsequently been deemed unconstitutional.4 On the other hand,
1. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1895 (Philip B. Gove, et al.
eds., 1986).
2. General deterrence of criminal conduct dictates that a clear mes-
sage be sent to society that repeated criminal behavior will aggra-
vate the need for punishment with each recurrence. To protect the
public from further crimes of the particular defendant, the likeli-
hood of recidivism and future criminal behavior must be consid-
ered. Repeated criminal behavior is an indicator of a limited likeli-
hood of successful rehabilitation.
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL, Ch.4, Pt.A, intro. comment.
(Nov. 1994) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.].
3. Id. The United States Sentencing Guidelines dictate that "[a] defendant with a
record of prior criminal behavior is more culpable than a first offender and thus de-
serving of greater punishment." Id.
4. Id. § 4A1.2, comment. (n.6). Id. App. C, amend. 353. "[S]entences resulting
from convictions that a defendant shows to have been previously ruled constitutional-
ly invalid . . are not to be counted." Id. App. C, amend. 353; see also United States
v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 448-49 (1972) (holding that a defendant's prior uncounseled
felony conviction could not be considered at sentencing). See generaly D. Brian King,
Note, Sentence Enhancement Based on Unconstitutional Prior Convictions, 64 N.Y.U.
whether a sentencing judge can consider an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction constitutionally valid because no imprisonment was imposed
is an issue that has long been debated.'
A major catalyst for this debate was the Supreme Court's plurality
decision in Baldasar v. Illinois.' In Baldasar, the Court invalidated a
sentence that had been enhanced as a result of a prior uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction.7 The failure of the Baldasar justices to adopt
a majority rationale' caused great disparity among the lower courts.9
Ten years after Baldasar, the United States Sentencing Commission
amended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to reflect the Commission's
view that such prior convictions should be considered in determining
the most appropriate sentence for a defendant. ° Finally, in 1994, the
United States Supreme Court in Nichols v. United States," overturned
Baldasar and adopted a viewpoint consistent with the Guidelines. 2 In
addition to providing the guidance that the lower courts had long been
seeking, the Nichols decision advanced the policy of enhancing the
punishment for recidivist behavior.
Part II of this Note examines the legal history behind the Supreme
Court's opinion in Nichols and provides an extensive discussion of the
Court's plurality decision in Baldasar.3 Part II also offers an overview
of the structure and application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. 4
Part HI details the facts surrounding Nichols' conviction and the prior
offenses that led to his enhanced sentence." Part III also contains an
outline of Nichols' procedural history." Part IV briefs the Court's opin-
ion in Nichols and examines the views taken in the concurring and
L REv. 1373 (1989) (examining when constitutionally suspect prior convictions may
be used to enhance a criminal sentence).
5. See iqfra note 88 and accompanying text.
6. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1921 (1994).
7. Id. at 224.
8. The Court's plurality opinion consisted of three separate concurring opinions
and one dissent. For a complete breakdown of the Court's decision in Baldasar, see
infra note 47.
9. See infra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
10. U.S.S.G. App. C, amend. 353.
11. 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
12. "[W]e hold, consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution, that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott because no
prison term was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance punishment at a subse-
quent conviction." Id. at 1928.
13. See infra notes 20-80 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23: 965, 1996] Nichols v. United States
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
dissenting opinions. 7 Part V discusses the impact of the Court's deci-
sion on the criminal justice system and its place in the current trend of
harsher sentencing for repeat offenders.'" Lastly, Part VI focuses on
the long-awaited harmonization of case law and the United States Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines.'9
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The History of the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in
pertinent part, that "[iun all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his de-
fence." ° Although this wording seems to afford the assistance of coun-
sel to all criminal defendants, the Supreme Court's interpretation of this
constitutional right has not been quite so broad. One of the Court's
earliest examinations of the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel came in 1932 with the Court's decision in Powell v. Alabama.'
In Powell, four indigent black defendants were convicted of rape and
sentenced to death.22 The Supreme Court relied on the Fourteenth
Amendment to reverse the convictions,2' holding that the defendants
had been denied due process of law when the trial court failed to ap-
point counsel in their defense.24 In making this determination, the
17. See infra notes 103-98 and accompanying text.
18. See inf-a notes 199-217 and accompanying text.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
21. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
22. Id. at 49-50. More specifically, the defendants were charged with the rape of
two white females. Id. at 49. The trial took place in Scottsboro, Alabama, in 1932,
where the environment of the community was described as "one of great hostility."
Id. at 51. As late as the morning of the first day of trial, the defendants were not
appointed formal counsel. Id. at 56. The most the judge had done was to appoint "all
the members of the bar" for arraignment purposes. Id. Counsel that finally represent-
ed the defendants did so without the slightest preparation for their defense. Id. at 57.
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court held that the defendants had been denied assis-
tance of counsel. Id. at 58. The real issue before the Court was whether this denial
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 60.
23. Id. at 50. The Fourteenth Amendment provides in pertinent part: "[Nior shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
24. Powell, 287 U.S. at 71. Although the Court acknowledged that the appointment
PoweU Court equated the defendants' right to counsel with the funda-
mental right to be heard that is guaranteed by the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.25
Thirty-one years after Powell, the Court revisited the right to counsel
issue in Gideon v. Wainwright.26 In Gideon, the Court closely reexam-
ined its determination in Betts v. Brady7 that the right to counsel was
not fundamental and essential to a fair trial and was therefore not bind-
ing on the state courts.' The Court criticized its prior holding as "an
abrupt break with its own well-considered precedents."' Expressly
of counsel might also be constitutionally required in other proceedings and circum-
stances, the Court limited its holding to the facts before it. Id. at 71-72.
25. Id. at 68-69. Acknowledging the importance of the right to be heard, the Court
stated, "It never has been doubted by this court, or any other as far as we know,
that notice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing of an enforce-
able judgment, and that they . . . constitute basic elements of the constitutional re-
quirement of due process of law." Id. at 68. The Court went on to add, "[t]he right
to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the
right to be heard by counsel." Id. at 68-69.
The Powell court noted that in "a capital case, where the defendant is unable to
employ counsel, . . . it is the duty of the court . . . to assign counsel for him as a
necessary requisite of due process of law." Id. at 71. Ten years later in Betts v.
Brady, the Supreme Court held the opposite; that the right to counsel was not a
right fundamental to a fair trial and therefore, the states were not compelled by the
Fourteenth Amendment to appoint counsel for every indigent defendant. 316 U.S. 455,
473 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Rather, the Betts
Court opted for a "totality of the circumstances" standard as the proper indicator of
whether the defendant had been afforded a fair trial. Id. at 462. In Betts, an indigent
defendant was charged with felony robbery in a Maryland state court. Id. at 456. His
request for assistance of counsel at his arraignment was denied, forcing him to put
on his own defense before the judge. Id. at 457. His attempt proved unsuccessful and
the trial court sentenced Betts to eight years in prison. Id.
As far as federal courts were concerned, the Supreme Court had earlier held in
Johnson v. Zerbst that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed the assistance of counsel to
all indigent defendants who had not "competently and intelligently" waived their right
to counsel and whose life or liberty were at stake. 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938).
26. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The facts of Gideon are very similar to those found in
Betts. See supra note 25. In Gideon, an indigent defendant, charged with a felony,
petitioned the Florida state court to appoint counsel in his defense. Gideon, 372 U.S.
at 336-37. The court denied his request, noting that the law only allowed the appoint-
ment of counsel to defendants charged with a capital offense. Id. at 337. After re-
ceiving a guilty verdict, the defendant filed a habeas corpus petition, asserting that he
had been denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the con-
troversy surrounding a defendant's constitutional right to counsel in state court.
Gideon v. Cochran, 370 U.S. 908 (1962).
27. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
28. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340. For a discussion of the Betts decision, see supra note
25.
29. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. The Gideon Court relied on its earlier decision in
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overruling Betts,' the Gideon Court found the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to be both fundamental and essential to a fair trial and thus
applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.3 Although no language in Gideon expressly limit-
ed the Court's holding to felony cases, lower courts applying Gideon
declined to extend the right to counsel to misdemeanor defendants.32
Powell as strong evidence of the fundamental nature of the right to counsel. Id. at
342-43; see supra notes 21-25 and accompanying text. The Court additionally alluded
to the irrefutable fact that both nonindigent defendants, as well as the government,
hire lawyers to defend and prosecute cases on a regular basis. Gideon, 372 U.S. at
344. The Court stated that this process, combined with the long and "unmistakable"
line of precedent supporting the fundamental nature of the right to counsel, further
emphasized that "in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel
is provided for him." Id. (commas omitted).
30. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 339.
31. Id. at 341. In his concurring opinion, Justice Clark noted that the impact of
the Court's decision was simply to erase any distinction between the right to counsel
for capital and noncapital offenses. Id. at 348 (Clark, J., concurring). According to
Justice Clark, a distinction of this nature has no basis in the Constitution and there-
fore the Sixth Amendment must be equally applied in both capital and noncapital
cases at the state level through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 349 (Clark, J., concurring).
Justice Harlan, in a separate concurring opinion, confined his interpretation of
the right to counsel to defendants charged with "offenses which, as the one involved
here, carry the possibility of a substantial prison sentence." Id. at 351 (Harlan, J.,
concurring). Parenthetically, Justice Harlan noted, "Whether the rule should extend to
a// criminal cases need not now be decided." Id. (Harlan, J., concurring).
32. See, e.g., Cableton v. State, 420 S.W.2d 534, 537 (Ark. 1967) ("We choose not
to anticipate that the Supreme Court of the United States will extend the rule of
Wainwright to misdemeanor cases."); Winters v. Beck, 397 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Ark.
1965) (declining to extend Gideon to misdemeanor cases), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907
(1966); New Orleans v. Cook, 191 So. 2d 634, 638 (La. 1966) (same); State v.
Sherron, 151 S.E.2d 599, 601 (N.C. 1966) (same); City of Toledo v. Frazier, 226
N.E.2d 777, 781 (Ohio Ct. App. 1967) ("[Alny argument, . . . that the Gideon case em-
braces misdemeanors is wholly without merit."). The various courts' limited interpreta-
tion of Gideon was most likely due in part to the language found in Justice Harlan's
concurring opinion. See supra note 31. For the Supreme Court's treatment of Gideon,
see David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions
After Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 517, 523 nn.26-27 (1982). In his concur-
ring opinion in Argersinger v. Hamlin, Justice Powell noted that the Court's deci-
sions after Gideon .presumed that Gideon was not relevant to misdemeanor convic-
tions. 407 U.S. 25, 44 n.l (1972) (Powell, J., concurring).
Finally, in 1972, the Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin de-
fined the constitutional boundaries of an indigent defendant's right to
counsel in criminal prosecutions.' The Court drew the distinguishing
line between those cases in which the defendant is actually imprisoned
and those in which the court imposes no prison time.3" The Court
made no distinction between the type of crime committed; rather, it
focused on the type of punishment imposed by the sentencing judge.
The Court concluded that "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no
person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty,
misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial."' Although the Argersinger Court attempted to establish actual
33. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
34. Argersinger, an indigent defendant, was convicted of carrying a concealed
weapon, a misdemeanor "offense punishable by imprisonment up to six months, a
$1,000 fine, or both." Id. at 26. Unrepresented by counsel, Argersinger was sentenced
to ninety days imprisonment. Id. In his habeas corpus action, Argersinger alleged that
he had been denied his constitutional right to assistance of counsel. Id. The Florida
Supreme Court rejected his contention by analogizing the right to counsel to the right
to a trial by jury. Id. at 26-27. Since the right to a jury trial attaches only when a
defendant faces the possibility of a prison sentence of six months or more, the Court
held that the same rule should apply to the right to counsel and thus denied
Argersinger the relief he sought. Id. (citing Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)).
35. Id. at 37. The Supreme Court rejected the Florida Supreme Court's equating
the right to counsel with the right to a jury trial, noting that, "[wihile there is histori-
cal support for limiting the 'deep commitment' to trial by jury to 'serious criminal
cases,' there is no such support for a similar limitation on the right to assistance of
counsel." Id. at 30 (footnote omitted).
The Argersinger Court did not attempt, however, to define the scope of the
Sixth Amendment for cases that did not involve actual incarceration of the defendant.
"We need not consider the requirements of the Sixth Amendment as regards the right
to counsel where loss of liberty is not involved ... for here petitioner was in fact
sentenced to jail." Id. at 37.
36. Id. Chief Justice Burger wrote a concurring opinion in which he noted the
burden this decision would inevitably place on the courts. Id. at 42 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring). It would force judges to decide before trial whether a charged offense
was worthy of imprisonment and thus whether the indigent defendant would be enti-
tied to the appointment of counsel. Although the Chief Justice foresaw an increased
strain on the judicial system as a result of the Court's decision, he noted that it was
not beyond the ability of experienced judges to make this initial determination. Id.
(Burger, C.J., concurring). Additionally, he viewed the Court's decision as logical,
given the continuing evolution of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 4344
(Burger, C.J., concurring).
Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, authored a separate concurring opin-
ion in which he rejected the majority's bright-line approach as "inflexible" and opted
for a case-by-case analysis of whether a defendant was afforded a fair trial despite
the absence of counsel. Id. at 49, 63 (Powell, J., concurring). The court's individual
determination would still be subject to the careful scrutiny of appellate review. Id. at
63-64 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell further opined that the Court's blanket
(Vol. 23: 965, 19961 Nichols v. United States
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imprisonment as the bright line at which the appointment of counsel
becomes constitutionally required, the decision still generated confusion
among the lower courts.3 7
Seven years later, in Scott v. Illinois,' the Supreme Court clarified
the proper application of Argersinger for cases in which imprisonment
was statutorily authorized but not actually imposed.' The Court again
adopted actual imprisonment as the constitutional dividing line, relying
on the main principle espoused in Argersinger, that "actual imprison-
ment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of im-
prisonent."0 Additionally, the Court set explicit limits on the reach
denial of discretion to judges in cases where any length of imprisonment is imposed
was a major flaw in the Court's decision. Id. at 51-52 (Powell, J., concurring). He
envisioned that most judges would elect to appoint counsel for indigent defendants in
nearly all cases, regardless of the seriousness of a charge, in order to preserve the
range of sentences prescribed by law. Id. at 55 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Powell felt that this burden would be too much for the criminal justice system to
bear. Id. at 58-59 (Powell, J., concurring).
37. Compare Sweeton v. Sneddon, 463 F.2d 713, 715-16 (10th Cir. 1972) (construing
Argersinger as prohibiting imprisonment without the assistance of counsel, but not
forbidding trial without representation) and Rollins v. State, 299 So. 2d 586, 589
(Fla.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974) (finding no violation of Argersinger when
uncounseled defendants were assessed a fine with the condition that if the fine were
not paid, imprisonment would result) with Potts v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 450, 454 (5th
Cir. 1976) (holding that after Argersinger, the right to counsel extends to misdemean-
or defendants faced with the possibility of imprisonment) and Webster v. Jones, 587
P.2d 528, 530 (Utah 1978) (holding that a defendant, charged with an offense punish-
able by imprisonment is entitled to counsel). In an effort to resolve the confusion
among lower courts, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Scott v. Illinois, 436
U.S. 925 (1978).
38. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
39. Id. at 373-74. The petitioner in Scott, an unrepresented indigent defendant, was
convicted of misdemeanor theft and fined $50. Id. at 368. The Illinois statute govern-
ing this offense provided a maximum penalty of either a $500 fine or one year in
jail, or both. Id. Scott argued that although he was not actually imprisoned, the pos-
sibility of imprisonment associated with his offense required the court to appoint
counsel in his defense. Id. Both the Illinois Supreme Court and the United States
Supreme Court rejected Scott's contention that he had a constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel. Id. at 369.
40. Id. at 373. Justice Powell authored a conctring opinion reemphasizing the
belief he espoused in Argersinger. Id. at 374 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell
stated that drawing the line at actual imprisonment would create a heavy burden on
the criminal justice system and, in many cases, force the judge to impose a fine
rather than the statutorily authorized prison sentence solely because of the im-
practicality of appointing defense counsel at that particular time. Id. (Powell, J., con-
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel by holding that "the Sixth and
the Fourteenth Amendments... require only that no indigent criminal
defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has
afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his de-
fense."
41
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion correctly predicted the next
issue which would arise as a result of the "actual imprisonment" stan-
dard enumerated by the Scott Court-the constitutionality of the collat-
eral use of an uncounseled conviction.42
cutting). For a summary of Justice Powell's concurrence in Argersinger, see supra
note 36.
Despite his concern over the inflexibility of the Court's bright-line rule, Justice
Powell noted that the need for "clear guidance to the hundreds of courts across the
country" outweighed his concerns, and thus joined the Court's opinion. Scott, 440 U.S.
at 374-75 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 373-74 (emphasis added). Plainly speaking, the right to counsel attaches
only if the defendant is actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment, no matter how
short. Id. Therefore, even though the statute under which Scott was convicted autho-
rized a maximum of one year of incarceration, the key fact was that Scott was only
fined for his offense and thus not constitutionally entitled to defense counsel at the
court's expense. Id. at 368-69.
After Scott, it was clear that an indigent defendant could be denied the assis-
tance of counsel and convicted of the charged offense, as long as no imprisonment
was imposed, even if incarceration was an authorized sanction for the offense. Yet,
this clarity in the law was not long-lived. Two years later, the picture began to blur
with the Court's plurality opinion in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1981) (per
curiam), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). See itra
notes 44-80 and accompanying text. The picture did not come into focus again until
the Court's recent decision in Nichols. See infra notes 103-34 and accompanying text.
42. Scott, 440 U.S. at 375-89. In his criticism of the "actual imprisonment" standard,
Justice Brennan noted that "[tihe scope of collateral consequences that would be con-
stitutionally permissible under the 'actual imprisonment' standard remains unsettled,
and this uncertainty is another source of confusion generated by this standard." Id. at
382 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In fact, three years later, the confusion culminated
with the Court's plurality opinion in Baldasar.
Justice Brennan drew from the roots of the Argersinger decision and suggested
that the Court adopt an "authorized imprisonment" standard, so that at a minimum,
the right to counsel equaled the right to a jury trial. Id. at 381-82 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting). An "authorized imprisonment" standard would compel the appointment of
counsel for all indigent defendants charged with an offense merely punishable by any
amount of imprisonment. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan believed
that the reasoning in Argersinger, which labeled the right to counsel as "more funda-
mental to a fair proceeding" than the right to a jury trial, mandated this result. Id. at
380-81 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In his opinion, the "actual imprisonment" standard
was an illogical extension of this reasoning. The Justice pointed out that when an
offense charged is punishable by more than six months imprisonment but no prison
time is imposed, the defendant may enjoy his right to a jury trial while being denied
his right to assistance of counsel. Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justices Mar-
[Vol. 23: 965, 1996] Nichols v. United States
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B. The Collateral Use of a Constitutionally Valid Uncounseled
Conviction for Enhancement Purposes:43 An Examination of
Baldasar v. Illinois
One year after Scott, the very concern to which Justice Brennan had
alluded in his Scott dissent came to life before the Supreme Court in
Baldasar v. Illinois.' At issue was whether a prior uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction, valid under Scott,45 could be collaterally used to
transform a subsequent misdemeanor into a felony with a mandatory
term of imprisonment attached.4" Although Baldasar was victorious in
shall and Stevens joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. Id. at 375.
Justice Blackmun wrote a dissenting opinion which would later become the
basis of his tie-breaking opinion in Baldasar. Id. at 389 (Blacknun, J., dissenting).
For a complete discussion of Justice Blackmun's Baldasar opinion, see infra notes
57-60 and accompanying text. The basic premise of Justice Blackmun's dissent paral-
leled that of Justice Brennan's dissent in that both advocated that at a minimum the
right to counsel should mirror the right to a jury trial. Scott, 440 U.S. at 389
(Blaclun, J., dissenting). Under Justice Blackmun's rule, an indigent defendant
would be afforded the assistance of counsel whenever he was accused of an offense
that authorized imprisonment exceeding six months or whenever a defendant was
actually imprisoned, regardless of the possible penalties associated with the offense.
Id. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. For purposes of this Note, unless otherwise indicated, phrases utilizing the lan-
guage "prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction" assume the defendant did not
validly waive his right to counsel.
44. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overuled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S.
Ct. 1921 (1994); see infra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of when an uncounseled misdemeanor satisfies the constitu-
tional guarantee enumerated in the Sixth Amendment, see supra notes 38-41 and ac-
companying text.
46. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 222. Baldasar was unrepresented by counsel when he
was convicted of misdemeanor theft and fined $159. Id. at 223. He was subsequently
convicted of theft of a $29 item. Id. At the time of his convictions, Illinois law treat-
ed theft of property valued at less than $150 as a misdemeanor, punishable by not
more than one year of imprisonment and a fine not to exceed $1000. Id. (citing ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, 16-1(e)(1), 1005-8-3(a)(1), 1005-9-1(a)(2) (1975) (amended and
reordered 1994)). Under an Illinois enhancement statute, however, a second convic-
tion for the same offense was converted into a felony with a prison term ranging
from one to three years. Id. (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, 1005-8-1(b)(5) (1975)).
Relying on this statute, the judge sentenced Baldasar to prison. Id.
his claim, the Court failed to adopt a single majority rationale." This
disunity would later lead to the downfall of the Baldasar decision.'
1. Justice Stewart's Concurrence
Justice Stewart, relying on the principles announced in Scott, felt that
Baldasar's sentence enhancement was constitutionally unsound.49 Al-
though Baldasar did not go to jail for the offense for which he was
unrepresented by counsel, in Justice Stewart's opinion, Baldasar's sub-
sequent prison sentence directly resulted from the prior uncounseled
conviction, in direct contradiction to the rule espoused in Scott.'
2. Justice Marshall's Concurrence-A Concern for Reliability
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Marshall embraced much of
the same reasoning as Justice Stewart in deciding that Baldasar's
uncounseled conviction could not serve as the basis for increasing the
prison term attached to his subsequent sentence.6 Justice Marshall
specifically noted that although Baldasar's initial theft conviction was
constitutionally valid under Scott, it "was not valid for all purposes."52
More notably, Justice Marshall stated that Baldasar's prior conviction
was "invalid for the purpose of depriving [Baldasar] of his liberty."'
47. The Supreme Court reversed Baldasar's felony conviction, citing the reasoning
found in the concurring opinions. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224. The plurality opinion
contained three concurring opinions, written by Justices Stewart, Marshall and
Blackmun, with Justices Brennan and Stevens joining both the Stewart and Marshall
opinions. Id. at 224, 229. Justice Powell wrote for the dissent, gaining the support of
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. Id. at 230.
48. Baldasar met its end with the Court's 6-3 decision in Nichols v. United States.
Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1923, 1928 (1994); see infra notes 103-98 and accompanying
text.
49. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and
Stevens joined the concurrence. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
50. Id. (Stewart, J. concurring). The Scott Court held that an indigent defendant
could not be sentenced to any prison time without the assistance of counsel to aid
in his defense. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979); see supra notes 38-41
and accompanying text.
51. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 225-26 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justices Brennan and
Stevens joined in the concurrence. Id. at 224, 229 (Marshall, J. concurring). Similar to
Justice Stewart, Justice Marshall viewed Baldasar's enhanced sentence as a direct
consequence of his uncounseled conviction and thus a patent violation of Scott. Id. at
226-27 (Marshall, J., concurring).
52. Id. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring).
53. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). In a footnote, Justice Marshall addressed the fact
that Baldasar could have received up to a year of incarceration for the second theft
offense without any consideration of his earlier uncounseled conviction. Id. at 226-27
[Vol. 23: 965, 1996] Nichols v. United States
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Justice Marshall additionally expressed concern over the reliability of
using an uncounseled conviction for the purpose of sentence enhance-
ment.' Responding to criticism by the four dissenting justices,' the
Justice fired back, stating that "a rule that held a conviction invalid for
imposing a prison term directly, but valid for imposing a prison term
collaterally, would be an illogical and unworkable deviation from our
previous cases." '
3. Justice Blackmun's "Tie-Breaking" Concurrence
Justice Blackmun cast the deciding vote in favor of the defendant;
however, his reasoning differed conceptually from the other concurring
opinions. Justice Blackmun focused his attention on the validity of the
underlying uncounseled conviction rather than on its use as an en-
hancement device."7 In Scott, Justice Blackmun dissented, establishing
his own rule concerning the point at which the constitutional right to
counsel attaches.' Equating the right to counsel with the right to a
jury trial, Justice Blackmun declared that an indigent criminal defen-
dant is entitled to the assistance of counsel whenever charged with an
offense bearing a possible penalty of more than six months imprison-
ment.' Relying solely on this bright-line rule, Justice Blackmun de-
n.1 (Marshall, J., concurring). In his opinion, this fact was not of great significance in
deciding the issue. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). To Justice Marshall, the mere fact
that Baldasar suffered "further deprivation of liberty on the basis of an uncounseled
conviction" was enough to invalidate his subsequent conviction on constitutional
grounds. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall stressed the Arger-
singer Court's emphasis on reliability and its recognition that, without the assistance
of counsel, a conviction is not sufficiently reliable to serve as the vehicle for impris-
onment. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
Working from this central premise, the Justice asserted, "An uncounseled convic-
tion does not become more reliable merely because the accused has been validly
convicted of a subsequent offense." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
55. In his dissent, Justice Powell characterized the Court's invalidation of the col-
lateral use of a valid uncounseled conviction as the creation of a "new hybrid." Id. at
232 (Powell, J., dissenting). Under this "new hybrid," an uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction, valid under Scott, would subsequently become meaningless for purposes of
sentence enhancement. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 228-29 (Marshall, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
57. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
58. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 389-90 (1979) (Blaclnun, J., dissenting).
59. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
clared Baldasar's prior uncounseled misdemeanor constitutionally in-
firm and thus invalid for any purpose.'
4. Justice Powell's Dissent
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent, criticized the Court's decision
as being inconsistent with the holding in Scott and providing no clear
guidance for the lower courts." The Scott Court had specifically vali-
dated misdemeanor convictions obtained in the absence of counsel
where no prison term was imposed.62 Based on this rule, Justice
Powell adamantly rejected the position taken by Justices Stewart and
Marshall, that an enhanced sentence based on a prior uncounseled con-
viction is tantamount to imposing imprisonment on the initial convic-
tion.' Justice Powell noted the long history supporting the proposition
that enhancement statutes do not alter or enlarge the prior convic-
tion." This being the case, the constitutional balance of Baldasar's pri-
or conviction was not upset merely because the trial court used it to
enhance his subsequent sentence.'
Justice Powell additionally pointed out the confusion created by the
Court's decision.' The Justice maintained that the decision forces
judges to predict a defendant's future criminal behavior in deciding
whether to forego appointing counsel and in turn forfeit the ability to
impose imprisonment.67 Denying the defendant counsel will ultimately
lead to a burial of the conviction in the sense that it cannot resurface in
a later proceeding to increase the sentence of a repeat offender.' Jus-
60. Baldsar, 446 U.S. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Because Baldasar's
original theft offense was punishable by up to one year in prison, Justice Blackmun
espoused that Baldasar's being denied appointed counsel nullified his conviction. Id.
at 230 (Blacknun, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 231 (Powell, J., dissenting). Joining Justice Powell were Chief Justice
'Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. Id. at 230.
62. See supra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
63. Baidasar, 446 U.S. at 231-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 232 (Powell, J., dissenting); see, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 451
(1962) ("Petitioners recognize that the constitutionality of the practice of inflicting se-
verer criminal penalties upon habitual offenders is no longer open to serious chal-
lenge . . . ."); Moore v. Missouri, 159 U.S. 673, 676-77 (1895) ("The increased severity
of the punishment for the subsequent offence is not a punishment for the same of-
fence for the second time, but a severer punishment for the subsequent offence ...
to deter those so inclined from the further commission of crime .... f) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
65. BaIdasar, 446 U.S. at 231-32 (Powell, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 231 (Powell, J., dissenting).
67. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tice Powell envisioned that the Court's decision would compel judges to
appoint counsel in all criminal proceedings in order to preserve the life
of the conviction, a burden Argersinger and Scott attempted to allevi-
ate.' Justice Powell concluded that the Baldasar decision would mud-
dy the waters the Scott Court had cleared."
5. Baldasar's Impact: A Web of Uncertainty
Justice Powell's fears proved well founded. Both state7 and feder-
al7 courts attempted to interpret the true meaning and breadth of
Baldasar, leading to a multitude of conflicting decisions about the col-
lateral use of constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanors. Most
of the ambiguity arose when courts attempted to apply the "narrowest
grounds" doctrine established in Marks v. United States74 for Supreme
Court plurality opinions.7" A majority of state courts have read
Baldasar broadly, prohibiting the collateral use of any uncounseled
misdemeanor conviction from increasing the term of imprisonment of a
subsequent offense." Many of the federal courts have taken a more re-
69. Id. at 234-35 (Powell, J., dissenting). In both Argersinger and Scott, the Court
drew a bright line at actual imprisonment for purposes of defining the boundaries of
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. In doing so the Court stated,
[W]e believe that the central premise of Argersinger-that actual imprison-
ment is a penalty different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprison-
ment-is eminently sound and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as
the line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel.
Argersinger has proved reasonably workable, whereas any extension would
create confusion and impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs
on 50 quite diverse States.
Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (footnote omitted).
70. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 235 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. See infra note 76 and accompanying text.
72. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
73. One of the main reasons for the Supreme Court's grant of certiorari in Nichols
was to resolve this ambiguity among the lower courts. Nichols v. United States, 114
S. Ct. 1921, 1925 (1994).
74. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
75. For a detailed explanation of the "narrowest grounds" doctrine, see irfra notes
113-17 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., Pananen v. State, 711 P.2d 528, 531-32 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985); Lovell
v. State, 678 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Ark.), opinion supplemented by 681 S.W.2d 395 (Ark.
1984); State v. Vares, 801 P.2d 555, 557 (Haw. 1990); State v. Cooper, 343 N.W.2d
485, 486 (Iowa 1984); State v. Oehm, 680 P.2d 309, 311-12 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984),
stricted view of Baldasar and limited its holding to the specific facts of
the case.77 Essentially, these federal courts have refused to extend
Baldasar beyond those cases in which the prior misdemeanor convic-
tion acted as the catalyst in converting the subsequent misdemeanor
into a felony carrying an attached prison term."
The inability of the lower courts to find a "common denominator"
among the Baldasar opinions is not surprising, given that the only rule
that emerges after aligning all the opinions is that an uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction punishable by more than six months imprison-
ment cannot be used to convert a subsequent misdemeanor into a fel-
ony bearing enhanced prison time.79 Despite the great disparity in de-
termining the proper scope and application of Baldasar, courts con-
curred that Baldasar provided no clear guidance and therefore its
precedential value was questionable at best.'
overruled by State v. Delacruz, 899 P.2d 1042 (Kan. 1995); State v. Dowd, 478 A.2d
671, 677-78 (Me. 1984); State v. Ulibarri, 632 P.2d 746, 747-48 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981),
cert. quashed, 96 N.M. 543 (1981); City of Pendleton v. Standerfer, 688 P.2d 68, 70
(Or. 1984) (en banc); Sargent v. Commonwealth, 360 S.E.2d 895, 899-901 (Va. Ct App.
1987); State v. Armstrong, 332 S.E.2d 837, 841 (W. Va. 1985), overruled by State v.
Hopkins, 453 S.E.2d 317 (W. Va. 1994).
Other courts have interpreted Baldasar as baning the use of a prior misdemean-
or conviction only when it enhances the subsequent penalty to a term greater than
that authorized for the subsequent offense itself. See, e.g., Moore v. State, 352 S.E.2d
821, 822 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 904 (1987); State v. Laurick, 575 A.2d
1340, 1347 (N.J.), cert. denied, Laurick v. New Jersey, 498 U.S. 967 (1990).
Still, other states have limited Baldasar's scope to the extent of Justice
Blackmun's concurrence, thereby allowing sentence enhancement when the prior con-
viction was not punishable by more than six months imprisonment. See, e.g, Hlad v.
State, 565 So. 2d 762, 764-66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990), affd, 585 So.* 2d 928, 930
(Ha. 1991); Commonwealth v. Thomas, 507 A.2d 57, 60-61 (Pa. 1986); State v. Novak,
318 N.W.2d 364, 368-69 (Wis. 1982).
77. See, e.g., United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715, 718 (4th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Burroughs, 5 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Castro-Vega, 945
F.2d 496, 500 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993); Wilson v. Estelle,
625 F.2d 1158, 1159 n.1 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 912 (1981). On the
other hand, there are cases in which the court embraced Baldasar, applying its en-
hancement proscription to the use of any prior uncounseled conviction. See, e.g.,
United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991), abrogated by Nichols v.
United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
78. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
79. See Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam), overruled by Nichols
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
80. See, e.g., Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir. 1983)
("In light of... the failure of the Baldasar majority to agree upon a rationale for
its result, the scope of the decision remains unclear." (footnote omitted)), cert. de-
nied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984); United States v. Robles-Sandoval, 637 F.2d 692, 693 n.1
(9th Cir.) ("The Court in Baldasar divided in such a way that no rule can be said to
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C. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Disparity in sentencing was also the central concern that prompted
Congress, through the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 and the United
States Sentencing Commission (Commission), to reevaluate the sentenc-
ing scheme present in the federal court system.8 Eventually, the Unit-
ed States Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) emerged with two
main goals intact. First, the Guidelines intended to achieve certainty
and honesty in sentencing, to guarantee that the sentence the judge
imposed was the sentence the defendant actually servedY Second, the
legislature proposed the Guidelines to reduce the disparity among feder-
al judges and in turn provide greater uniformity in sentencing.'
In order to accomplish its goals, the Commission designed a sentenc-
ing table to assist judges in determining the appropriate sentencing
range for a particular defendant.84 Once a judge determines a
have resulted."), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941 (1981). See generally Rudstein, supra note
32 (questioning the precedential value of the Baldasar decision); Lily Fu, Note, High
Crimes from Misdemeanors: The Collateral Use of Prior, Uncounseled Misdemeanors
Under the Sixth Amendment, Baldasar and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 77
MINN. L REV. 165, 182 (1992) (proposing a clarification for the "unresolvable ambigu-
ity of Baldasar").
81. Pub. L No. 98473 §§ 211-39, 98 Stat 1987 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3551-3559, 3561-3566, 3571-3574, 3581-3586 (1988) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988)).
The Sentencing Reform Act was signed into law on October 12, 1984, as Chapter 11
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); see also 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. (98 Stat.) 3182, 3398. This Act created the
United States Sentencing Commission (Commission), consisting of seven voting mem-
bers, three of whom must be active federal judges, and one nonvoting member. 28
U.S.C. § 991(a) (1988). The Commission's main duty was to promulgate Sentencing
Guidelines (Guidelines) and policy statements to be utilized by the federal courts. Id.
The Guidelines became effective on November 1, 1987, (Effective Date and Savings
Provision, Constitutionality) and were subsequently held constitutionally valid. 18
U.S.C. § 3551 (1988); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
82. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, Pt.A, intro. This plan still included a qualification for "good
time." 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988). After the first year of imprisonment, sentencing au-
thorities could reduce an offender's sentence by 54 days per year. Id.
83. U.S.S.G. Ch.1, PtA, intro.
84. In order to select a sentence within the Guideline range, a judge must first
determine a defendant's specific offense level. Id. § 1B1.1(a). There are 43 offense
levels that form the vertical axis of the sentencing table. Id. § 2A. Every offense has
a base offense level, and from this, adjustments can be made in both directions if
the circumstances permit. Id. §§ IBl.l(c), (e), 1B1.3(a).
After determining the defendant's "total offense level," the judge must then calcu-
defendant's offense level and criminal history category, the sentencing
table' provides a range of imprisonment from which the judge must
choose the defendant's sentence." Some discretion in sentencing is
necessary; therefore, the Commission provided certain mechanisms by
which the judge could depart from the sentencing range prescribed by
the sentencing table.'
late the defendant's criminal history category, of which there are six. Id. §§ 1Bl.1(f),
4Al.1. To assess the defendant's criminal history category, the judge adds together
the criminal history points the defendant has accumulated as a result of his prior
convictions. Id. § 4Al.L. The number of points assigned to each particular offense
varies depending upon sentences imposed, not time served. Id. For example, a defen-
dant earns three points for "each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year
and one month, "two points for sentences between 60 days and 13 months, and one
point, up to four total, for all other sentences. Id. §§ 4Al.l(a)-(c). For a complete list
of the potential criminal history points, see id. § 4Al.l(a)-(f). A defendant with a
total of zero or one criminal history point is placed in Criminal History Category I.
Category ii includes those with two or three points; Category III, four through six
points; Category IV, seven through nine; Category V, ten through twelve; and Category
VI is reserved for those defendants with thirteen or more points. Id. § 5A.
By using prior convictions to increase a defendant's criminal history category
and corresponding sentence, the Commission sought to punish recidivism and to pro-
tect the public from the defendant's future criminal behavior. In the Guidelines, the
Commission notes, "A defendant with a record of prior criminal behavior is more
culpable than a first offender and thus deserving of greater punishment." Id. Ch.4,
PtA, intro, comment.
85. Id. Ch.5, Pt.A, intro. comment.
86. When assessing a defendant's criminal history category, the Guidelines allow
for a departure from a particular sentencing range if "reliable information indicates
that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the
defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit
other crimes" or over-represents the seriousness or likelihood. Id. § 4A1.3; see, e.g.,
United States v. Shoupe, 35 F.3d 835, 839 (3d Cir. 1994) (upholding the validity of
downward departure of base offense level and criminal history category); U.S. v.
Brown, 999 F.2d 1150, 1152 (7th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (upward departure justified
when criminal history calculations did not include pending charges and Canadian
conviction); U.S. v. Tilley, 964 F.2d 66, 74 (1st Cir. 1992) (upward departure justified
when criminal history calculation did not accurately reflect likelihood of recidivism
based on prior offenses for negotiating worthless instruments); cf United States v.
Wyne, 41 F.3d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1994) (defendant's four DUI convictions not con-
sidered sufficiently serious to warrant an upward departure). The Guidelines provide
a non-exhaustive list of other types of information that the judge may consider when
contemplating a departure. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a)-(e).
A second departure device for defendants who substantially assist the
prosecution in the investigation of a third person is available upon motion of the
government. Id. § 5Kl.1. Furthermore, the judge has authority to depart from the
assigned sentencing range if the particular case includes "an aggravating or mitigating
circumstance" that the Commission did not adequately consider. Id. § 5K2.0. The
Commission recently amended § 5K2.0 to allow a judge in exceptional or ex-
traordinary cases to consider circumstances that are not "ordinarily relevant" to a
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1. The Interrelation Between the Guidelines and the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment imposes some obvious restrictions on what
type of information and which convictions a judge may consider in de-
termining an appropriate sentence under the Guidelines. For example,
any conviction initially obtained in violation of the right to counsel is
forbidden from use both in calculating a defendant's criminal history
score and in enhancing a subsequent sentence. s7 On the other hand,
whether an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott,
can be considered in the sentencing phase was a source of great con-
troversy in the courts for many years.' In 1990, the Commission made
its position clear, approving the use of valid uncounseled misdemeanors
departure determination. Id. App. C, amend. 508. The victim's conduct, rather than
the defendant's, can also play a role in reducing a sentence. Id. § 5K2.10:
Justice Souter relied upon these departure mechanisms in his Nichols concur-
rence. Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1930 (1994); see ivfra notes 135-53
and accompanying text. For a complete discussion and list of cases involving the
various departure mechanisms available to a sentencing judge, see JEFRI WOOD- &
DIANE SHEEHEY, GUIDELINE SENTENCING: AN OUTLINE OF APPELLATE CASE LAW ON SE-
LECTED ISSUES 108-51 (1994).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449 (1972) (holding that felony
conviction obtained in violation of Gideon cannot be used to enhance punishment for
another offense); Evenstad v. United States, 978 F.2d 1154, 1157 (9th Cir. 1992) (re-
manding case because of defendant's claim that robbery conviction considered in sen-
tencing was tainted by ineffective assistance of counsel); see also supra note 4.
88. Despite the Commission's 1990 amendment to § 4AI.2, see infra note 89,
courts. were split on whether to count this type of misdemeanor in a defendant's
criminal history score. Compare United States v. Ford, 19 F.3d 1271, 1274 (8th Cir
1994) (approving use of uncounseled misdemeanor for computing criminal history
score), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 741 (1995) and United States v. Falesbork, 5 F.3d 715,
717-19 (4th Cir. 1993) (enhancing sentence through consideration of uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction) and McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 533-34 (lth Cir.
1992) (refusing to extend Baldasar to invalidate enhancement based on a juvenile
conviction), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1423 (1993) and United States v. Castro-Vega, 945
F.2d 496, 499-500 (2d Cir. 1991) (declining to extend Baldasar by considering
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in determining criminal history score under the
Guidelines), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993) and United States v. Eckford, 910
F.2d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1990) (allowing use of constitutionally valid uncounseled mis-
demeanor for sentence enhancement) with United States v. Norquay, 987 F.2d 475,
482 (8th Cir. 1993) (prohibiting use of possibly uncounseled prior tribal conviction for
sentence enhancement) and United States v. Brady, 928 F.2d 844, 854 (9th Cir. 1991)
(barring use of uncounseled tribal misdemeanor conviction as vehicle for upward de-
parture), abrogated by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994).
in calculating the defendant's criminal history score.' The Supreme
Court's decision in Nichols ends the ambiguity that had plagued the
lower courts for more than a decade. Moreover, by finally placing the
Guidelines in sync with case law the Nichols decision allows one of the
original purposes of the Guidelines-to minimize disparity in sentenc-
ing-to become a reality.
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In 1990, Kenneth Nichols found himself in the familiar surroundings
of a courtroom, faced with a charge of conspiracy to possess cocaine
with intent to distribute.' Seven years prior to his arrest, Nichols was
similarly convicted of federal felony drug charges." That same year,
Nichols was convicted in Georgia under state misdemeanor laws for
driving under the influence (DUTI). Unrepresented by counsel, Nichols
was fined $250, but spared any prison time for his misdemeanor of-
fense.' After pleading guilty to the 1990 drug charge, Nichols was sen-
tenced to a 235-month term of imprisonment.93 In determining Nichols'
89. In 1990, the Commission took a stance in opposition to the concurring opin-
ions in Baidasar by amending § 4A1.2 of the Guidelines and adding the following
passage as background commentary: "Prior sentences, not otherwise excluded, are to
be counted in the criminal history score, including uncounseled misdemeanor sentenc-
es where imprisonment was not imposed." U.S.S.G. App. C, n.353. In explaining the
newly adopted amendment, the Commission stated:
[Tihe amendment clarifies the Commission's intent regarding the counting of
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for which counsel constitutionally is
not required because the defendant was not imprisoned. Lack of clarity re-
garding whether these prior sentences are to be counted may result not only
in considerable disparity in guideline application, but also in the criminal his-
tory score not adequately reflecting the defendant's failure to learn from the
application of previous sanctions and his potential for recidivism. This
amendment expressly states the Commission's position that such convictions
are to be counted for the purposes of criminal history under Chapter Four,
Part A.
Id.
90. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. Nichols' charge was brought under 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1988). Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
91. Niciwls, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
92. Id. Under the applicable Georgia law, the maximum punishment for driving
under the influence was one year in prison and a $1000 fine. Id. at 1924 n.1. For a
discussion on the effect of the presence of counsel at misdemeanor proceedings, see
generally Gerald R. Wheeler, The Benefits of Legal Representation in Misdemeanor
Court, 19 CRIM. L. BuLL 221 (1983).
93. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924.
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sentence, the court relied upon the sentencing table found in the United
States Federal Sentencing Guidelines.' Nichols' two prior offenses,
including his uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, were used to in-
crease his criminal history category from Category II to Category II.l 5
As a direct result of his placement in this higher category, Nichols re-
ceived a twenty-five month enhancement to his sentence.9 The Su-
preme Court's opinion focused on the lower court's use of Nichols'
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction in assessing his criminal history
score.
B. Opinions of the Lower Courts
In an attempt to overturn his conviction on constitutional grounds,
Nichols relied on the Court's previous ruling in Baldasar7 Nichols
contended that the lower court's consideration of his uncounseled mis-
demeanor conviction violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel as
construed in Baldasar.' The United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Tennessee rejected this argument, stating that Baldasar
"stands only for the proposition that a prior uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction may not be used to create a felony with a prison term."'
94. The Sentencing Table consists of 43 offense levels and six criminal history lev-
els, which increase with the severity of the crime. U.S.S.G. § 4Al.1; see supra notes
84-86 and accompanying text
95. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. Nichols' previous felony drug conviction counted as
three criminal history points, while his misdemeanor DUI conviction added another
point. The combination of these points led to the increase in Nichols' criminal history
category. Id. This elevated criminal history category then served as the basis for in-
creasing Nichols' sentence range from the 168-210 months allowed under Category 1I
to the 188-235 months allowed under Category HE1 Id. For a complete discussion of
the different categories and sentences available under the Sentencing Guidelines, see
supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
96. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. Nichols' maximum sentence of imprisonment was
increased from 210 months to 235 months. See supra note 95.
97. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. The ultimate result of the plurality opinion in
Baldasar, which Nichols attempted to rely on, was that a defendant's "prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used collaterally to impose an
increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction." Baldasar v. Illinois,
446 U.S. 222, 226 (1980) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by Nichols
v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). For a more complete discussion of Baldasar,
see supra notes 44-80 and accompanying text.
98. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1924. For a detailed discussion of a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
99. United States v. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. 277, 279 (E.D. Tenn. 1991) (emphasis
Therefore, since Nichols' offense was already characterized as a felony,
Baldasar's narrow ruling did not apply, and Nichols' enhanced sentence
was free of constitutional defects."°
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, similarly relying on a
narrow reading of Baldasar.'° The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to resolve the Sixth Amendment issue surrounding
the collateral use of prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions for
sentence enhancement. '
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S OPINION
A. The Majority Opinion: A Reexamination of Baldasar v. Illinois
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court,"° identified the main
issue as "[w]hether the Constitution prohibits a sentencing court from
considering a defendant's previous [valid] uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction in sentencing him for a subsequent offense. " "°
The Court commenced its opinion with the basic premise that a mis-
demeanor defendant has no constitutional right to counsel as long as
no term of imprisonment is imposed for the offense." 5 In support of
added), qffd, 979 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1992), affd, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994). Although the
district court declined to extend Baldasar to the facts in Nichols, the court noted
that Nichols had not waived his right to counsel. Id. at 277. In an alternative argu-
ment to the Supreme Court, the prosecution contended that even if the court found
Baldasar applicable, thus barring the use of uncounseled misdemeanors for sentence
enhancement in a subsequent conviction, the district court erred in concluding that
there was no valid waiver of the right to counsel. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1925 n.4.
The Supreme Court declined to address the waiver issue due to its decision overrul-
ing Baldasar. Id.
100. Nichols, 763 F. Supp. at 280. The district court based its narrow reading of
BaJlasar in part on the absence of a majority opinion in Baldasar. Id. at 279.
101. Nichols, 979 F.2d at 407. The court of appeals confined the rule in Baldasar to
situations in which the consideration of a prior uncounseled misdemeanor would con-
vert the current misdemeanor into a felony. Id. at 415-16. The court based its narrow
application of Baldasar in part on its previous decision in Charles v. Foltz, 741 F.2d
834, 837 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985) (holding that evidence of
prior constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanor convictions could be used for
impeachment purposes). Nichols, 979 F.2d at 418.
102. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1925.
103. Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined in the majority opinion.
Id. at 1923. Justice Souter filed an opinion concurring in judgment. Id. at 1929
(Souter, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun authored a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
also authored a separate dissenting opinion. Id. at 1937 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 1924.
105. Id. at 1925.
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this proposition, the Court relied on its decisions in Argersinger v.
Hamlin"° and Scott v. Illinois,°7 which emphasized actual imprison-
ment as the boundary line between constitutional and unconstitutional
uncounseled convictions."8 In accordance with Gideon v. Wain-
wight,' the Court briefly acknowledged the difference between the
constitutional guarantees afforded to felony defendants and misdemean-
or defendants."'
The Nichols Court then began a detailed examination of the plurality
opinion in Baldasar, the main reason for its grant of certiorari."' The
Court split its examination of the case into separate discussions of the
four opinions authored by the Baldasar Justices."2
106. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
107. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
108. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1925-26. The Court first noted the Argersinger distinction
between actual imprisonment and the mere threat of imprisonment or monetary fines.
Id.; see Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. The Court reemphasized this difference in Scott,
stating, "[Tihe central premise of Argersinger-that actual imprisonment is a penalty
different in kind from fines or the mere threat of imprisonment-is eminently sound
and warrants adoption of actual imprisonment as the line defining the constitutional
right to appointment of counsel." Scott, 440 U.S. at 373.
109. 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963).
110. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1925 n.9. In Gideon, the Court acknowledged an indigent
defendant's constitutional right to counsel in the absence of a valid waiver. Gideon,
372 U.S. at 344. Aligning the Court's decision in Gideon with its later decision in
Scott, the difference in constitutional rights enjoyed by felons or misdemeanants be-
comes clear. An indigent felon, whether actually incarcerated or not, is constitutional-
ly entitled to the assistance of counsel, whereas an indigent misdemeanant is afforded
constitutional recourse under the Sixth Amendment only if the court fails to provide
counsel and imposes a prison sentence. Compare Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) with Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). For a more complete discussion of
Gideon, see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
111. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1925.
112. Id. at 1926. Three of the four Baldasar opinions-including Justice Stewart's
concurrence joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens-supported the holding that a
prior uncounseled misdemeanor conviction could not be used to increase a later
misdemeanor to a felony. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224 (1980) (per curiam),
overruded by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994); see supra notes 49-60
and accompanying text. Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Stevens,
also authored a concurring opinion. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 224; see supra notes 51-56
and accompanying text. Justice Blackrnun wrote a concurring opinion, causing the 5-4
split to fall in favor of the defendant. Batdasar, 446 U.S. at 229; see supra notes 57-
60 and accompanying text. Justice Powell, writing for the dissent, was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 230; see
supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
Next, the Court considered its opinion in Marks v. United States,'13
which set out a test for determining how to apply a plurality holding to
subsequent cases. The "narrowest grounds" doctrine, as it has been
called, espouses that "[wihen a fragmented Court decides a case and no
single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices,
'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds.'""' 4 The Nichols Court noted, however, that this approach has
not been easily applied with respect to the Baldasar opinion."'
Numerous state and federal courts have struggled to find the narrowest
grounds that represent the Court's holding in Baldasar."6 Recognizing
the great uncertainty and ambiguity that has resulted from attempts to
apply the Marks "narrowest grounds" doctrine to Baldasar, the Court
concluded that it would be illogical to continue down the same path
"when it has so obviously baffled and divided the lower courts which
have considered it.""' 7 Instead, the Court conceded that this high "de-
gree of confusion" created by the Baldasar plurality decision compelled
a reexamination of the issue."18
The Court began its examination by noting that a majority of the
Baldasar Court"9 had supported the holding in Scott v. Illinois.'
113. 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
114. Id. at 193 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15, vacated by 429
U.S. 875 (1976)); see Nichols, 114 S. Ct at 1926. See generally Mark A. Thurmon,
When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential Value of Supreme Court
Plurality Decisions, 42 DuKE LJ. 419 (1992) (discussing the narrowest grounds doc-
trine).
115. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926.
116. Id. at 1926-27. One court noted its frustration in attempting to apply Marks
"narrowest grounds" doctrine: "[Tihere does not seem to be any such least common
denominator among the Baldasar opinions . . . ." State v. Novak, 318 N.W.2d 364, 368
(Wis. 1982). The Nichols Court mentioned numerous federal courts that found the
narrowest grounds doctrine unworkable when attempting to apply it to Baldasar.
Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926; see, e.g., United States v. Castro-Vega, 945 F.2d 496, 499-
500 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1250 (1993); United States v. Eckford, 910
F.2d 216, 219, n.8 (5th Cir. 1990); Schindler v. Clerk of Circuit Court, 715 F.2d 341,
345 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984). Other courts have defaulted to
one of the concurring opinions as their version of the holding in Baldasar. Courts
adopting Justice Blackmun's opinion include Santillanes v. United States Parole
Comm'n, 754 F.2d 887, 889 (10th Cir. 1985) and State v. Orr, 375 N.W.2d 171, 176
(N.D. 1985). Of the courts that have selected one opinion as the "holding," a majority
have adopted Justice Marshall's concurrence. Thurmon, supra note 114, at 445; see,
e.g., United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494
U.S. 1037 (1990); Addvensky v. Gunnell, 605 F. Supp. 334, 338 (D. Conn. 1983); Peo-
ple v. Olah, 298 N.W.2d 422, 422 (Mich. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 957 (1981).
117. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927.
118. Id.
119. This majority included the four dissenters from Baldasar. Chief Justice Burger,
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Accordingly, the Court returned its attention to its decision in Scott,
2
'
the basic principle being that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to counsel does not attach when no prison time is imposed, even
if imprisonment is authorized by statute. 22 In other words,
uncounseled misdemeanor convictions are constitutionally valid, as long
as the defendant is not sentenced to any prison time. Embracing Scott,
the Court expanded its ruling one step further into the sentencing
phase, holding that "an uncounseled conviction valid under Scott may
be relied upon to enhance the sentence for a subsequent offense, even
though... [the subsequent] sentence entails imprisonment.""2
In finding that the collateral use of an uncounseled misdemeanor for
enhancement purposes does not violate Scott or the Constitution, the
Court reasoned that even though the subsequent sentence involves
additional prison time as a result of a prior offense, the penalty for the
earlier conviction remains unchanged. 124 In support of its position, the
Court referred to numerous past decisions that have characterized re-
peat-offender laws as penalizing only the subsequent offense.'25 The
and Justices Stewart, White, Powell, and Justice Rehnquist. Id.
120. Id. (discussing the holding in Scott v. illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979)); see supra
notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
121. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927.
122. See id.
123. Id.
124. Id. This very principle was brought to the Court's attention by the dissent in
Baldasar. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (per curiam) (Powell, J. dis-
senting), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct 1921 (1994).
125. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927; see supra note 64. Repeat-offender or "recidivist"
statutes have also been found nonviolative of the Eighth Amendment's proscription
against cruel and unusual punishment. See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annota-
tion, Imposition of Enhanced Sentence Under Recidivist Statute as Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment, 27 KLR. FED. 110 (1976). Further, these statutes have withstood
other constitutional challenges. See Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616, 631 (1912)
(rejecting contention that recidivist statute violates double jeopardy clause, right to
trial by jury or proscription against cruel and unusual punishment); McDonald v. Mas-
sachusetts, 180 U.S. 311, 313 (1901) (same); Jill C. Rafaloff, Note, The Armed Career
Criminal Act: Sentence Enhancement Statute or New Offense?, 56 FORDHAM L. REV.
1085, 1093-94 (1988) (highlighting the constitutional validity of recidivist statutes).
As the Court noted in Parke v. Raley, "[Wie have repeatedly upheld recidivism
statutes 'against contentions that they violate constitutional strictures dealing with
double jeopardy, ex post facto laws, cruel and unusual punishment, due process,
equal protection, and privileges and immunities. ' " Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 27
(1992) (quoting Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 560 (1967)).
Court further noted that the sentencing process has continually afford-
ed judges wide latitude in determining the appropriate sentence to im-
pose on an individual defendant.2 ' Sentencing courts have consistent-
ly considered a defendant's prior convictions and past criminal behav-
ior, even without attached convictions.'27 The Court found it logical
that Nichols' DUI conviction be considered constitutionally permissible
for enhancement purposes."' In fact, the prosecution had proven the
DUI conviction under a higher standard, beyond a reasonable doubt."
The Court then dismissed Nichols' contention that at a minimum
courts should warn misdemeanor defendants of the possibility that their
convictions could be used to enhance a later sentence.'" In rejecting
Nichols' argument, the Court reasoned that such a warning would re-
quire dramatic changes in the misdemeanor conviction process, the cost
of which would substantially outweigh any benefit defendants might
receive from being reminded that the courts do not look favorably on
past criminal offenses and consequently are likely to impose a harsher
sentence the next time around. '31
The Court concluded its opinion by expressly overruling Baldasar
and holding that "consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments of the Constitution,... an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction,
valid under Scott because no prison term was imposed, is also valid
126. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1927-28; see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct 2194,
2199 (1993) ("Traditionally, sentencing judges have considered a wide variety of fac-
tors in addition to evidence bearing on guilt in determining what sentence to impose
on a convicted defendant.").
127. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
128. Id.
129. Id. In essence, the Court was trying to emphasize that, according to its deci-
sion in Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949), it would have been constitu-
tionally permissible for the judge to increase Nichols' sentence by presenting evidence
of his conduct leading up to the DUI, without any mention of his DUI conviction.
Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928 (citing McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 91 (1986)).
Therefore, it would be irrational to exclude evidence of a conviction based on the
very same conduct when the court requires a higher standard of proof for use of the
conviction than it does for consideration of the conduct. Id.
In direct response to this point, a recent article stated, "The Court's assumption
that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction is necessarily as reliable as evidence
presented by counsel and proved by a preponderance at a sentencing hearing ignores
the unique role of counsel in adversary proceedings." The Supreme Court, 1993
Term--Leading Cases, 108 HARv. L REv. 159, 188 (1994) [hereinafter Leading Cases].
130. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
131. Id. Since many misdemeanor convictions take place in police or justice courts,
which are not courts of record, documentation of whether a warning was actually
given would not be feasible. Id. Moreover, defining the parameters of such a warning
would be a difficult task since states and the federal courts, under the Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines, are likely to treat recidivism in different ways. Id.
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when used to enhance punishment at a subsequent conviction." 32 The
Court qualified its holding by adding that individual states do have the
liberty, based on their own constitutions, to provide counsel for all indi-
gent defendants charged with misdemeanors, regardless of the sentence
imposed." In fact, many States provide counsel whenever imprison-
ment is even authorized by statute. "
B. Justice Souter's Concurrence
Justice Souter concurred separately to emphasize that, although he
agreed with the majority's judgment, he differed in his reasoning. Jus-
tice Souter rejected the majority's contention that the holding in
Baldasar should be overruled.3 ' In his opinion, the Baldasar Court
was equally divided on the issue of whether an uncounseled misde-
meanor, valid under Scott, could be used to enhance a subsequent sen-
tence." Justice Souter pointed out that despite Justice Blaclnun's
Baldasar concurrence, he differed from the other Justices in that he
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1928 n.12.
134. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6.1(b) (1994) (entitling indigent defendant to
appointment of counsel "in any criminal proceeding which may result in punishment
by loss of liberty" or where "the interests of justice so require"); CAL PENAL CODE
§ 858 (West 1985) (requiring that any defendant arrested for public offense be noti-
fied of right to counsel at every stage of the proceedings); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 604-A.2 (1986 & Supp. 1992) (requiring appointment of counsel for indigent defen-
dants charged with a felony or misdemeanor); Alexander v. City of Anchorage, 490
P.2d 910, 915 (Alaska 1971) (construing right to counsel enumerated in Alaska Stat-
utes § 18.85.100 as including all indigent misdemeanor defendants); Frazier v. State,
391 N.E.2d 1192, 1194 (Ind. Ct. App. 1979) (construing Article I, § 13 of the Indiana
Constitution as establishing right to counsel in misdemeanor cases); Mahomey v. City
of Tulsa, 542 P.2d 965, 966 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975) (construing Article 11, § 20 of the
Oklahoma State Constitution as mandating appointment of counsel in misdemeanor
cases).
Willingness of these states to provide counsel for all indigent defendants charged
with misdemeanors is likely a result of the Court's decision in Scott. Because Scott
mandates that counsel be appointed when any jail time is imposed, the only way to
avoid forcing a judge to decide before trial whether imprisonment will be ordered is
to appoint counsel in alt misdemeanor cases. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-
74 (1979). Denial of counsel forecloses a judge from imposing a prison sentence of
even one day without the sentence being considered unconstitutional under Scott. Id.
135. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1929 (Souter, J., concurring).
136. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
abided by his dissent in Scott'37 and found Baldasar's uncounseled
conviction invalid for any purpose." According to Justice Souter, Jus-
tice Blackmun's opinion was devoid of any consideration of whether a
conviction, valid under Scott, could subsequently be used for enhance-
ment purposes.'39 Essentially, as Justice Souter viewed it, the
Baldasar Court was equally divided, and thus no precedential value
should be given to the decision.4 °
Justice Souter criticized Baldasar for espousing no clear principle to
which the Court could adhere.' Nonetheless, the Justice acknowl-
.edged the concern of Justices Stewart and Marshall, that Scott had been
violated because Baldasar's prior uncounseled conviction essentially
served as the basis for a prison sentence.' According to Justice
Souter, though, the court did not need to address this question to deter-
mine the outcome of the instant case," because the unique structure
of the Sentencing Guidelines was not in effect when the Court decided
Baldasar. This unique structure is the "escape route" provided by
the Guidelines that authorizes a judge to depart from the set range of
sentences prescribed for a particular criminal history category.' Jus-
137. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
138. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1929 (Souter, J., concurring). According to Justice
Blackmun's dissenting view in Scott, which he reemphasized in Baldasar,
[A]n indigent defendant in a state criminal case must be afforded counsel
whenever the defendant is prosecuted for a nonpetty criminal offense, that is,
one punishable by more than six months imprisonment, . . . or whenever the
defendant is convicted of an offense and is actually subjected to a term of
imprisonment.
Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Therefore, according to Justice Blackmun, because Baldasar's offense was punish-
able by more than six months imprisonment and he was unrepresented by counsel, his
conviction was invalid for any purpose. Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 230 (1980)
(per curiam) (Blackmun, J., concurring), overruled by Nichols v. United States, 114 S.
Ct 1921 (1994).
139. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1929 (Souter, J., concurring).
140. Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 216 (1942)
(holding that an affirmance by an equally divided Court is of no precedential value);
see also Thurmon, supra note 114, at 443 n.133 (discussing Baldasar's precedential
value).
141. See Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1929 (Souter, J., concurring).
142. Id. at 1929-30 (Souter, J., concurring).
143. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring).
145. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Even though a 1993 amendment to the Sentencing
Guidelines expressly stated that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions where impris-
onment was not imposed should be counted in the criminal history score, U.S.S.G.
App. C, amend. 353, the Guidelines also provide a departure mechanism if "reliable
information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect
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tice Souter noted that relevant to the issue at hand, the Guidelines
allow for a downward departure in cases where the assigned criminal
history category "'significantly over-represents the seriousness of a
defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will
commit further crimes. '" ' A defendant thus has, the opportunity to
highlight the unreliable aspects of his prior uncounseled conviction.'47
A defendant can further attempt to "explain away" a prior conviction
by demonstrating that, in deciding whether to plead guilty to a misde-
meanor, the temptation of a low fine and no attorney fees outweighed
the foreseeable repercussions of having a conviction on his record.'"
According to Justice Souter, this departure mechanism adequately ad-
dresses the "risk of unreliability" commonly associated with an
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction.' He agreed with the majority
that the authority to consider past criminal conduct, combined with the
discretion to depart, was consistent with the broad inquiry traditionally
involved in the sentencing process.5 °
Based largely on the fact that Nichols did not attempt to invoke the
discretionary departure mechanism, Justice Souter limited his agree-
ment with the majority to the constitutional question before the Court:
Whether the district court's consideration of Nichols' previous
uncounseled misdemeanor in computing his criminal history score vio-
lated the Constitution? 5' Although he agreed that it was "constitution-
ally permissible... to consider a prior uncounseled misdemeanor con-
viction," Justice Souter distinguished himself from the majority by re-
jecting the proposition that prior uncounseled misdemeanors should
lead to automatic sentence enhancement.' 2 Because of his belief that
the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct" or over-represents the sever-
ity of the defendant's record. Id. § 4A1.3; see supra note 86 and accompanying text;
see, e.g., United States v. Beckham, 968 F.2d 47, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting that
career offender status over-represented defendant's criminal history).
146. Nicws, 114 S. Ct. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3).
147. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
148. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
149. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). Given that the nature of the departure mechanism
found in the Guidelines satisfies the concern for reliability, Justice Souter found no
authority for interpreting the Sixth Amendment to preclude a court from considering
a valid uncounseled conviction at the sentencing phase. Id. (Souter, J., concurring).
150. Id. (Souter, J., concurring); see supra note 126 and accompanying text.
151. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring).
152. Id. (Souter, J., concurring). What Justice Souter failed to recognize was that
prior uncounseled misdemeanors are not necessarily vehicles for automatic sentence
the majority's opinion took this additional step, Justice Souter con-
curred only in the judgment."
C. Justice Blackmun's Dissent: A Concern for Reliability
Justice Blackmun dissented, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg."s He began his opinion in much the same fashion as did the
majority, with a historical look at the Sixth Amendment." Justice
Blackmun, however, focused most of his attention on the reasoning
from his concurrence in Baldasar," that the right to counsel should
attach "not only where the defendant was convicted and sentenced to
jail time, but also where the defendant was convicted of any offense
punishable by more than six months imprisonment, regardless of the
punishment actually imposed."'57 Justice Blackmun made clear that
although he did not expressly advocate it in his Baldasar concurrence,
he supported the view espoused in Baldasar that an uncounseled con-
viction valid under Scott was void for purposes of sentence enhance-
ment for a subsequent offense."
enhancement. Notably, the defendant in Nichols received only one point for his prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction. Id. at 1924. This point alone would not have
been enough to increase his criminal history category; however, Nichols had already
accumulated three points from a prior felony. Id. It was the one point from the mis-
demeanor that pushed him into the higher category and enhanced his sentence. Id.
Therefore, had Nichols' record been clean, consideration of his prior uncounseled
misdemeanor would not have automatically enhanced his sentence. See supra notes
84-86 and accompanying text.
153. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1931 (Souter, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1931-32 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blacknun began with the
Court's recognition of the Sixth Amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright as being "'fun-
damental and essential to a fair trial.'" Id. at 1931 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963)). Next, Justice Blackmun emphasized
the Court's affirmation in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), that "any deprivation
of liberty, no matter how brief, triggers the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel." Id.
at 1932 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74). Finally, the Jus-
tice discussed the Court's decision in Baldasar, noting that a majority of the Court,
including himself, concluded that the defendant's uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
could not serve as a basis for enhancing a subsequent sentence. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
156. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
157. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1932 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Scott, 440 U.S.
at 389-90 (1979)).
1518. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). This clarification was no doubt in response to
Justice Souter's remark in his concurring opinion that Justice Blackmun's opinion was
devoid of any consideration of whether a conviction, valid under Scott, could be used
later for enhancement purposes. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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Justice Blackmun criticized the Court's opinion as falsely adhering to
Scott."5 According to the Justice, the Court misread Scott."6 In Jus-
tice Blackmun's view, because the Court held unconstitutional the di-
rect use of an uncounseled conviction in imposing a term of imprison-
ment, it logically followed that the Court should also prohibit its use
collaterally. 6' Justice Blackmun stressed concern over what he de-
clared was an irrefutable fact, that Nichols' twenty-five month sentence
enhancement was a direct consequence of his uncounseled DUI convic-
tion, in direct violation of Scott.62
Justice Blackmun then shifted his focus to his main concern-the
reliability of misdemeanor convictions as an indicator of guilt."6 He
noted that the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
had long centered on decreasing the risk of unreliability through the
appointment of counsel."1 In his opinion, no distinction should be
drawn between imposing a prison sentence for the convicted offense
and imposing or increasing the amount of prison time for a later of-
fense." He emphasized that a conviction obtained in the absence of
counsel may not accurately reflect the defendant's guilt."6 In a coun-
seled sentencing proceeding, the defense attorney can test the reliability
of the State's evidence through cross-examination.'67 If the State pres-
ents only the record of a prior conviction, which was the outcome of a
trial at which the defendant had no assistance of counsel, there exists a
marked difference in reliability."6 Justice Blackmun further alluded to
159. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1933 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
160. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
161. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "It is more logical, and more consistent with the
reasoning in Scott, to hold that a conviction that is invalid for imposing a sentence
for the offense itself remains invalid for increasing the term of imprisonment imposed
for a subsequent conviction." Id. (Blackmun. J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun did agree with the Court's
contention, however, that recidivist statutes do not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
163. Nichols, 114 S. CL at 1933. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blaclnun identi-
fied the issue he thought was truly facing the Court: "[Ius a prior uncounseled misde-
meanor conviction sufficiently reliable to justify additional jail time imposed under an
enhancement statute?" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Blaclanun, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun used McMillan v. Pennsylvania,
the innate danger in allowing a sentencing judge to consider an "unreli-
able" conviction, stating that "introduction of a record of conviction
generally carries greater weight than other evidence of prior con-
duct.""
Next, Justice Blackmun attempted to discredit the majority's reliance
on the tradition embedded in the broad discretion afforded sentencing
judges by noting that the case law the Court cited did not address the
Sixth Amendment.7 Furthermore, in Justice Blackmun's view, the
cases to which the majority referred were factually dissimilar in that
they did not rely on prior convictions as the method of sentence en-
hancement.7 '
477 U.S. 79 (1986), which the Court had previously cited, as an example of the pro-
cedure defense counsel would use in a situation where the State was attempting to
prove actual conduct at the sentencing phase. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1934 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting). The State in McMillan, in an attempt to enhance the defendant's sen-
tence, presented evidence of the defendant's possession of a firearm during the
course of the crime for which he had just been convicted. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 82.
Justice Blackmun asserted that defense counsel would have the opportunity during
the proceeding to examine the witnesses and present counter-proof to discredit the
State's evidence, thus allowing a sufficient probe into the reliability of the State's
contentions. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1934-35 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On the other
hand, when a record of conviction is introduced at this stage, no similar opportunity
exists to test the reliability of a conviction obtained in the absence of counsel. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
169. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blaclunun noted
that the nature of the Guidelines compels this increased emphasis. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting). The process of determining a defendant's criminal history category re-
quires a judge to tally the number of prior convictions on the defendant's record and
impose a sentence that corresponds to the particular category. Id. (Blackinun, J., dis-
senting); see supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. Departures from this category
are given only after defense counsel offers the requisite proof. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
170. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1933 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
again cited McMillan, this time for the proposition that the case was devoid of any
mention of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and it did not involve the use of a
prior conviction for enhancement purposes. Id. (Blaclunun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun also attacked the Court's reliance on Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1993), on the grounds that Mitchell involved the First Amendment, not the Sixth,
and did not discuss the use of prior convictions. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1934 n.2
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
171. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1933-34 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
also alluded to McMillan for the fact that it involved felony convictions as opposed
to misdemeanors. Id. at 1933 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing McMillan, 477 U.S.
at 82). He identified the distinguishing factor in the Court's use of United States v.
Tucker. Tucker dealt with prior uncounseled felony convictions. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at
1933-34 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446
(1972). The Justice further criticized the Court's reliance on Williams v. New York,
because it did not involve a defendant who was unrepresented by counsel, and more-
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Justice Blackmun then launched a direct attack on Justice Souter's
concurring opinion." He noted that allowing the defendant a chance
to explain his prior conduct does not sufficiently alleviate the reliability
concerns embedded in the Sixth Amendment." Furthermore, Justice
Blackmun did not share Justice Souter's belief that the ability of a sen-
tencing judge to depart downward validates the use of a prior
uncounseled misdemeanor conviction for enhancement purposes. 4
Justice Blackmun rejected the Court's rule,' espousing one that in
his opinion was truly consistent with the Sixth Amendment as well as
the case law interpreting it: "[A]n uncounseled misdemeanor conviction
over, the defendant did not receive any type of enhanced sentence, both which
where important factors in Nichols. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1934 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting); see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 244 (1949).
172. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra notes 135-
53 and accompanying text (providing an analysis of Justice Souter's opinion).
173. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Given the mechanical
structure of the sentencing guidelines, Justice Blackmun envisioned that it was highly
unlikely that courts gave much credence to a defendant's attempt to discredit a prior
conviction. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "As Chief Justice Burger recognized in
Argersinger, '[aippeal from a conviction after an uncounseled trial is not likely to be
of much help to a defendant since the die is usually cast when judgment is entered
on an uncounseled trial record.'" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 41 (1972) (Burger, C.J., concurring)).
174. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Again, Justice Blackmun's skepticism arose from
the structure of the sentencing guidelines, in particular the scope of the departure
mechanism. Id. (Blacknun, J., dissenting); see supra note 86 and accompanying text;
see also U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3. Because of its narrow definition, Justice Blackmun saw the
departure mechanism as being invoked in very limited circumstances, thus leaving the
reliability concern-which lies at the heart of the Sixth Amendment-unmet. Nichols,
114 S. Ct. at 1935 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
A recent article reviewing the Nichols decision raised a similar concern with
respect to the departure mechanism. See Leading Cases, supra note 129, at 190.
"Even when courts are allowed to depart, in reality most judges have applied the
Guidelines mechanically, without an appreciation of the opportunities for discretion."
Id. The article further characterized the departure mechanism as a "flimsy protection
against the risk that a defendant will face several years of incarceration based solely
upon an uncounseled conviction." Id. at 190-91; see also Donald P. Lay, Rethinking
the Guidelines: A Call for Cooperation, 101 YALE L.J. 1755, 1761 (1992) (claiming that
few opportunities exist for departure).
175. The majority held that "consistent with the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
of the Constitution ... an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, valid under Scott
because no term of imprisonment was imposed, is also valid when used to enhance
punishment at a subsequent conviction." Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
never can form the basis for a term of imprisonment.... "176 Justice
Blackmun defended his rule by referring to the precedent supporting
the proposition that an inherent risk of unreliability exists in convic-
tions obtained in the absence of counsel.' He noted that it was these
very same reliability concerns that caused the Court to prohibit the
collateral use of uncounseled felonies for the purpose of sentence en-
hancement.' In fact, Justice Blackmun expressed the view that the
need for counsel in a misdemeanor proceeding is just as compelling as
the need in a felony proceeding, and thus there is no need to draw a
distinction between the two for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.'79
Justice Blackmun then cited the plurality opinion in Baldasar to en-
hance the foundation for his rule and quoted Justice Marshall's opinion
in that case:
176. Id. at 1935 (Blaclnun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
177. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun cited Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963), and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), in support of the
proposition that a conviction's reliability rests upon the assurance that the defendant
was afforded a fair trial, which in turn depends upon the presence and assistance of
counsel at trial. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
A recent article analyzing Nichols raised these same reliability concerns. See
Leading Cases, supra note 129, at 186. According to the article, by the Court's argu-
ing that Nichols' sentence enhancement was not additional "punishment" for his mis-
demeanor conviction, it avoided the real issue at hand, reliability. Id. In further criti-
cism, the article noted, "Because the Nichols Court neither applied the reasoning of
past Sixth Amendment cases nor developed a new analysis, the opinion does not
provide any principled guidance for future cases. Nichols thus leaves open the possi-
bility that the right to counsel will be further eroded." Id.
178. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1935 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 1935-36 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Given the utility of counsel in [misdemeanor] cases, the inherent risk of unre-
liability in the absence of counsel, and the severe sanction of incarceration
that can result directly or indirectly from an uncounseled misdemeanor, there
is no reason in law or policy to construe the Sixth Amendment to exclude
the guarantee of counsel where the conviction subsequently results in an in-
creased term of incarceration.
Id. at 1936 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun failed to mention, however, the distinguishing factor separating
felonies from misdemeanors with respect to the Sixth Amendment. Uncounseled felony
convictions are invalid for any purpose. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1926 n.9; see Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341 (1963). Uncounseled misdemeanors are invalid only if a
sentence of imprisonment is attached. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
In effect, Justice Blackmun attempted to redefine the holding in Scott, which was
not the Court's focus in Nichols. If an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction, constitu-
tionaliy valid under Scott, cannot be used in a subsequent proceeding, it is essentially
stripped of its constitutional validity. The initial conviction, as well as the rule in Scott,
is thereby rendered useless.
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An uncounseled conviction does not become more reliable merely because the
accused has been validly convicted of a subsequent misdemeanor. For this reason,
a conviction which is invalid for purposes of imposing a sentence for the offense
itself remains invalid for purposes of increasing a term of imprisonment for a
subsequent conviction under a repeat-offender statute."s
Under this rule, 8' the uncounseled misdemeanor retains validity for ini-
tially imposing a penalty short of imprisonment, but loses its validity for
the purpose of enhancing the term of imprisonment in a subsequent con-
viction."s Despite its dual nature, Justice Blackmun found his rule to
be both workable and logical." Further, the Justice envisioned that his
rule would provide the necessary bright line, making it easy for lower
courts to follow and apply."S
Although Justice Blackmun conceded that his rule would likely lead to
an increase in the appointment of counsel for indigent defendants, he
criticized the majority's rule for producing that same result." Because
of the more severe repercussions that could result from a misdemeanor
conviction after Nichols, Justice Blackmun emphasized the likelihood
that the majority's rule would encourage indigent defendants to obtain
counsel, where before they might have pleaded on their own."
180. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1936. (Blackanun, J.,dissenting) (quoting Baldasar v. 11li-
nois, 446 U.S. 222, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam) (Marshall, J., concurring), overruled by
Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921 (1994)).
181. In his Baldasar dissent, Justice Powell labeled the use of a misdemeanor con-
viction for limited purposes a "hybrid" conviction. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 232 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
182. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1936 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun found
no flaw in adopting a hybrid nature for uncounseled misdemeanor convictions. Id. at
1936 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 1936 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
184. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that his rile's definitive
nature would give judges and parties the knowledge up front that no imprisonment
could be imposed directly or collaterally unless counsel was appointed. Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Justice Blackmun overlooked the fact that his proposed rule contradicts Scott, or
at least nullifies its value to the judicial system by mandating the appointment of
counsel in every misdemeanor case in order for the conviction to have any future
judicial worth. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979).
185. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1936 (Blaclnun, J., dissenting).
186. Id. at 1937 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun noted that defendants
like Nichols, who might have been advised in the past to plead without the help of
counsel, would now be compelled to seek counsel because of the threat of imprison-
ment that lingered in the future. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
In conclusion, Justice Blackmun returned to the issue of reliability and
reiterated his concern that the Court's holding did not adequately ad-
dress or correctly resolve this important constitutional principle with re-
gard to uncounseled misdemeanor convictions.'87
D. Justice Ginsburg's Dissent
Justice Ginsburg, in addition to joining Justice Blackmun's dissent,"
authored a brief dissent of her own."s She focused entirely on the dis-
tinction between the situations in Nichols and Custis v. United
States."° Decided two weeks before Nichols,9 ' Custis involved a de-
fendant who attempted to collaterally attack the validity of two prior
convictions that had served as the basis for his classification as an
Armed Career Criminal.'92 He claimed that both convictions were ob-
tained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance
of counsel. 93 Justice Ginsburg framed the question presented in Custis
as "where, not whether, the defendant could attack a prior conviction for
constitutional infirmity."' 9 Justice Ginsburg immediately noted the dif-
ferent issue introduced by Nichols.9 '
187. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188. See supra notes 154-87 and accompanying text.
189. Nichols, 114 S. CL at 1937 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
190. 114 S. Ct 1732 (1994).
191. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1937 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
192. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. The two convictions Custis objected to were ob-
tained in a Maryland state court. One was a 1985 burglary conviction and the other a
1989 attempted burglary conviction. Id.
193. Id. Although Custis was represented by counsel in both proceedings, he
claimed that his attorneys failed to provide him with adequate representation and as
a result he had been denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel.
Id.
194. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1937 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg described
the holding of Custis as follows: "[W]ith the sole exception of convictions obtained
in violation of the right to counsel, a defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding
has no right to attack collaterally a prior state conviction used to enhance his sen-
tence under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984." Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(citing Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1738). The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 mandates
a minimum sentence of 15 years and a maximum of life in prison without parole for
felons convicted of possession of a firearm if the felon's criminal record contains
three previous convictions for a violent felony or serious drug offense. 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e) (1988); see Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1734. The Custis Court acknowledged that
Custis was free to attack his convictions in either the Maryland state courts or
through habeas review. Custis, 114 S. Ct. at 1739.
195. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1937 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg noted
that in Nichols, the defendant was not objecting to the constitutional validity of the
prior conviction itself, but rather to its subsequent use as an enhancement device in
the sentencing phase. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Justice Ginsburg then identified the flaw that, in her view, was evident
in the majority's opinion: Although Nichols' uncounseled misdemeanor
conviction was valid under Scott, the impact of the conviction was great-
ly intensified through its enhancement of his subsequent conviction."
She noted that the prior uncounseled misdemeanor was given much
"heavier weight" than first contemplated.'97 Justice Ginsburg would
have invalidated Nichols' enhanced sentence on the ground that his prior
uncounseled conviction should have been restricted to its constitutional
limits, providing no basis for any term of imprisonment.' 98
V. IMPACT
Nichols' main contribution to the criminal justice system is undoubt-
edly its resolution of the ambiguity that has plagued the lower courts
since Baldasar." Sentencing judges now have direct authority to con-
sider prior uncounseled misdemeanor convictions as part of a
defendant's criminal history.2" A defendant may avoid this result only if
the prior misdemeanor conviction was constitutionally invalid under the
rule espoused in Scott.2"' The lower courts have followed Nichols with-
out hesitation.2"
It seems odd that Justice Ginsburg would choose to focus so intently on the
differences between Custis and Nichols when the Court itself placed very little, if
any, emphasis on Custis. See id. at 1924-28.
196. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
197. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
198. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
199. See supra notes 71-80 and accompanying text.
200. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
202. See, e.g., United States v. Corrado, 53 F.3d 620, 621-22 n.l (3d Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that the defendant's concession that Nichols allows the use of uncounseled misde-
meanor convictions in assessing criminal history score rendered the issue moot on
appeal); United States v. Evans, 51 F.3d 764, 765 n.2 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting the
defendant's concession that Nichols "forecloses" the question of whether a judge can
include constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanors in assessing a defendant's
criminal history score); United States v. Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1451, 1454 (10th Cir. 1994)
("[Blecause none of defendant's misdemeanor convictions resulted in imprisonment,
each was constitutional. Their use by the trial court was therefore proper."); United
States v. Severe, 29 F.3d 444, 447 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying Nichols to uphold district
court's consideration of defendant's three prior uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tions), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 763 (1995); Snyder v. Grayson, 872 F. Supp. 416, 417-
24 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (discussing Nichols and declaring defendant's 17 prior misde-
Nichols also represents another step in the criminal justice system's
current trend of intolerance for recidivism. Several states, most recently
California, have enacted mandatory sentencing laws that significantly
enhance the punishment for recidivist behavior. °" Most of these en-
hancement statutes were passed in response to public pressure urging
the legislature to toughen penalties for the rising tide of crime plaguing
communities across America.2' In essence, Nichols reaches one step
meanor convictions constitutionally valid and thus properly considered for sentence
enhancement purposes), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct 234 (1995); Paletta v. City of Topeka,
893 P.2d 280, 284-86 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (citing Nichols as the reason for declining
to follow two cases that had previously relied upon Baldasar); Ghoston v. State, 645
So. 2d 936, 938 (Miss. 1994) (citing Nichols as controlling on the issue of whether
prior uncounseled misdemeanors can be considered in sentencing phase of subsequent
offense); Griswold v. Commonwealth, 453 S.E.2d 287, 289 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (relying
on Nichols to hold that defendant's conviction, which was unconstitutional under
Scott, could not be used to enhance his subsequent sentence); James v. Common-
wealth, 446 S.E.2d 900, 902 (Va Ct. App. 1994) (relying on Nichols to affirm trial
court's sentence enhancement based on defendant's prior uncounseled DUI convic-
tion); State v. Hopkins, 453 S.E.2d 317, 323-24 (W. Va. 1994) (applying Nichols to
uphold lower court's use of defendant's prior uncounseled misdemeanor for sentence
enhancement); cf. Jackson v. State, 643 A.2d 1360, 1374 n.13 (Del. 1994) (declining to
extend Nichols' holding to a capital sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 956
(1995).
Nichols was also used as the basis for two recent cases that arose in the mili-
tary justice system. See United States v. Lawer, 41 M.J. 751, 754 (C.G. Ct. Crim. App.
1995) (suggesting the requirements surrounding the subsequent use of nonjudicial
punishment be reexamined in light of Nichols); United States v. Kelly, 41 M.J. 833,
833, 842 (N.M. Ct. Crim. App.) (applying Nichols to abandon restrictions placed on
subsequent use of nonjudicial punishment record for sentence enhancement), review
granted, 43 M.J. 172 (C.M.A. 1995).
203. The California Legislature recently enacted the "Three Strikes" law aimed at ca-
reer felons. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1995). The statute imposes a sen-
tence of 25 years imprisonment to life for those felons who have committed two
prior violent or serious felonies. Id. At least 15 other states are seriously considering
the enactment of similar statutes. See Stephen Braun & Judy Pasternak, A Nation
with Peril on Its Mind, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al, A17. At a minimum, every
state has adopted some type of legislation that enhances sentences for recidivist be-
havior. For a comprehensive overview of various states' enhancement statutes, see 24
C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1526-28 (1989 & Supp. 1995).
Although Nichols is distinguishable from the current three strikes laws because it
addresses misdemeanors as opposed to felonies, the goal in Nichols is similar-deter
and punish recidivism. Nichols reaches even deeper by forcing first-time offenders to
accept responsibility for their actions and learn quickly from their mistakes.
204. See generally Barbara S. Barrett, Sentencing Guidelines: Recommendations for
Sentencing Reform, 57 Mo. L. REV. 1077 (1992). "As Baltimore Circuit Court Judge
Marshall Levin, chairperson of the Maryland Sentencing Guidelines Board, said, 'Judg-
es are sentencing to prison more, longer and avowedly for purposes of retribution.
They seem to do so partly out of response to public outrage over crime and partly
because of their own concern and frustration about increasing crime.'" Id. at 1080
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further by expanding the class of recidivists who receive enhanced sen-
tences to include misdemeanants. While deterrence of crime is a laudable
goal, scholars have been quick to criticize sentence enhancement laws as
an expensive and unworkable solution to the nation's crime problem."5
One of the major concerns about the rise in sentence enhancement
schemes is the corresponding increase in the prison population.2"
Although the detrimental effects associated with an increase in the
prison population are valid concerns with any enhancement scheme, a
closer look at Nichols reveals that the Court's decision will not result in
mandatory sentence enhancement for every defendant that has been
previously convicted of one uncounseled misdemeanor. Nichols simply
allows the judge to consider a defendant's prior uncounseled misdemean-
or in determining the most appropriate sentence. Under the current Sen-
tencing Guidelines, a defendant can acquire only one criminal history
point for every constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanor convic-
tion on his record." 7 Because the Guidelines are set up so that there is
a minimum two-point spread between each criminal history category,2"
only those defendants whose records are replete with prior convictions
will be subject to an increased sentence. In fact, if Kenneth Nichols had
not been previously convicted of a felony drug charge, which counted as
three criminal history points,2" he would have had a criminal history
(quoting Judge Levin in J.S. Bainbridge Jr., The Return of Retribution, A.B.A. J., May
1985, at 60, 62).
One of the most public displays of distrust for the criminal justice system came
after 12 year-old Polly Elaas was abducted from her home and murdered by a repeat
offender. See Jennifer Warren, Thousands Say Tearful Goodby to Polly Klaas, L.A.
TwEs, Dec. 10, 1993, at Al, A38. California passed the Three Strikes law directly
following this incident. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West Supp. 1995); see supra note 203
and accompanying text.
205. One recent article, criticizing California's Three Strikes Statute, stated, "[T]he
statute does not promote long-term crime prevention because it fails to cope with the
socioeconomic roots of California's crime problem . . . . [lImplementing the statute
will saddle California with huge economic and administrative costs that will further
undermine long-term prevention goals." Recent Legislation, 107 HARv. L. REV. 2123,
2124 (1994); see also Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining
the Effectiveness of Determinate Sentencing Reform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 61, 121 (1993);
Steven A. Capps, Jury's Out on Effect "S Strikes" Will Have: Prisoners to Increase,
But Will it Cut Crime?, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 8, 1994, at Al.
206. See Capps, supra note 205, at Al. "The new 'three strikes and you're out'
law ...will result in tens of thousands of new ...prisoners .... " Id.
207. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
208. See supra note 84.
209. See Nichols v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 1921, 1924 (1994); supra note 95 and
1001
score of one, which corresponds to Criminal History Category .21 As a
result of this categorization, Nichols would have received the same sen-
tence as if he had no prior convictions on his record.2 ' The only rea-
son that Nichols' misdemeanor conviction carried such great weight in
the sentencing phase was because of the recidivist behavior on his re-
cord. Kenneth Nichols was going to serve a long prison sentence regard-
less of his prior DUTI conviction.
Commentators have also criticized enhanced sentencing schemes for
their potential impact on a defendant's desire to plead guilty or proceed
without the assistance of counsel."2 The balancing test that a defendant
undoubtedly goes through before deciding whether to plead guilty now
takes on a new dimension. As Justice Souter noted in his Nichols concur-
rence, the attraction of a low fine and ability to avoid attorney fees usu-
ally outweighs the minimal repercussions normally associated with a
misdemeanor conviction.2"3 Yet, a misdemeanor that has the ability to
significantly increase a defendant's future sentence also has the potential
to tip the scale to the other side. It is conceivable that in light of Nichols,
a defendant will place greater weight on the future consequences of a
guilty plea and therefore choose to expend both the time and resources
to hire an attorney.
A likely result of a defendant's unwillingness to plead guilty or proceed
without counsel would be an increase in costs and delay for both the
courts and the defendant.2 4 Any rise in the number of criminal defen-
dants awaiting trial would ultimately lead to an increase in court crowd-
ing and delay, a problem courts are already desperately struggling to
combat. Furthermore, individual defendants would incur greater costs,
not only in attorney fees, but also in the costs inherent in a process that
is plagued by delay. These potential effects are the same concerns that
Justice Blackmun alluded to in his dissenting opinion in Nichols.215
It is possible, however, that any detrimental impact Nichols might have
on misdemeanor defendants or the criminal justice system has been over
emphasized. As Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in Nichols, even prior to
the decision, defendants were undoubtedly well aware that the next time
accompanying text.
210. See supra note 84.
211. This result is due to the fact that Criminal History Category I consists of both
those defendants that have zero or one criminal history points. Id.
212. Marc Mauer, Politics, Crime Control . . . and Baseball?, CRiM. JUST., Fall 1994,
at 30, 63.
213. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1930 (Souter, J., concurring).
214. See Mauer, supra note 212, at 63.
215. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. 1936-37 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra note 186 and
accompanying text.
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they faced criminal charges the court was likely to look unfavorably
upon any prior criminal conduct on their records.216 Therefore, it is un-
likely that the number of defendants who actually choose to bypass an
inexpensive and expedient resolution to misdemeanor charges will dra-
matically increase. Pleading guilty to a misdemeanor might still represent
the best option for most defendants, regardless of any future ramifica-
tions that may attach to their decisions.
It is inevitable that some of the hostility toward the criminal justice
system's current trend of sentence enhancement will be aimed at the
Court's recent decision in Nichols. Yet, aligning Nichols with the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines indicates that the decision will not have a grave impact on
those defendants who have previously been convicted of one
uncounseled misdemeanor."7 On the other hand, for those who fail to
learn from their past mistakes and who continue to add criminal behav-
ior to their resume, Nichols sends the message that recidivism will not
be tolerated. As the old adage states, "What goes around comes around."
VI. CONCLUSION
After fourteen years of ambiguity and uncertainty following the Su-
preme Court's decision in Baldasar, the Nichols decision has finally pro-
vided lower courts with a bright-line rule that should be easy to apply. In
holding that constitutionally valid uncounseled misdemeanor convictions
can be used to enhance a subsequent sentence, the Nichols Court took a
position consistent with both the Sentencing Guidelines and the current
trend of enhanced penalties for recidivists. Nichols supplies clear guid-
ance as to when a lower court may use an uncounseled conviction to
enhance a sentence. As a result, the Sentencing Commission's goal of
consistency in sentencing, which lies at the heart of the Sentencing
Guidelines, is now closer to becoming a reality.
ANDREA E. JOSEPH
216. Nichols, 114 S. Ct. at 1928.
217. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
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